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The FAA and the USERRA: Pro-
Arbitration Policies Can Undermine
Federal Protection of Military
Personnel
Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the United States Supreme Court, statutory claims may be the
subject of an arbitration agreement contained in an individual employment con-
tract. In Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether claims brought under the Uniformed Ser-
vices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) are subject to arbi-
tration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The applicability of the FAA to
employment contracts is an integral part of the analysis in this case. To determine
whether arbitration is an appropriate forum for the plaintiff's claim, discussion of
both the structure and purpose of the USERRA is necessary. In the instant deci-
sion, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration stance, but the
question of whether an agreement to arbitrate may, in some cases, be an inappro-
priate waiver of substantive statutory rights remains.
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
Michael T. Garrett (Garrett), a Marine Reserve Officer, was hired by Circuit
City in 1994. 3 After Garrett began working for Circuit City, the company imple-
mented an "Associate Issue Resolution Program" for resolving employment-
related disputes.4 When Circuit City adopted the dispute resolution program, each
employee, including Garrett, received a receipt form, a list of the program's rules,
and an Arbitration Opt-Out Form.5 The information given to each employee
stated that claims regarding the termination of employment would be settled by
final and binding arbitration. 6 Garrett acknowledged, in writing, that he received
the policy information, and he did not opt-out of the arbitration provision within
the allotted time period.7
1. 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006).
2. Id.
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Garrett alleged that his supervisors began to unjustifiably criticize and disci-
pline him during the period in which the United States military was preparing for
combat in Iraq, between December 2002 and March 2003. He was fired in
March 2003, and he attributes this action to his status as a Marine Reserve Offi-
cer.9 Garrett brought suit against Circuit City under the Uniformed Services Em-
ployment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).' ° Garrett alleged that sec-
tion 4302(b) of the USERRA precluded the enforcement of the arbitration agree-
ment." Section 4302(b) provides that the Act supersedes any contract or agree-
ment that reduces, limits, or eliminates any right or benefit provided by the
USERRA.2 Garrett claimed that a "right or benefit provided by" the USERRA
includes a plaintiffs right to bring suit in federal court.' 3 Circuit City filed a mo-
tion to compel arbitration, in accordance with the Associate Issue Resolution Pro-
gram.
14
The district court denied Circuit City's motion to compel arbitration, holding
that section 4302(b) of the USERRA overrode the enforcement of the arbitration
agreement.' 5 Circuit City appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 16 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in refusing to compel arbitra-
tion and, therefore, reversed.1 7 In reversing the district court's decision, the Fifth
Circuit held that when parties have made a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate,
USERRA claims are subject to arbitration under the FAA.18
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Governing Law
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted to counter judicial hostility
toward arbitration agreements and to hold such agreements equal to other con-
tracts. 19 The FAA provides that written arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable," unless grounds exist that would provide for the revoca-
tion of any contract.2° The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA as a manifes-





12. 38 U.S.C. 4302(b) (2006).
13. Garrett, 449 F.3d at 676.
14. Id. at 674.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 681.
18. Id.
19. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citations omitted). The FAA,
originally enacted in 1925, 43 Stat. 883, was reenacted and codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United
States Code. Id.
20. Id. at 24-25.
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Supreme Court has held that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration
agreement.
22
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,23 the United States Supreme
Court dealt with the issue of whether Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration.24 Gilmer's employer
required him to register as a securities re resentative, and his registration applica-
tion contained an agreement to arbitrate. When Gilmer was fired at the age of
62, he brought suit against his employer alleging that his termination violated the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 26 His employer moved to com-
27pel arbitration, relying on the agreement in Gilmer's application and the FAA.
The United States Supreme Court recognized that statutory claims may be the
subject of an arbitration agreement and that once such an agreement has been
made, it is enforceable unless Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue.2 8 The court noted that the burden is on
the party seeking to avoid arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude a
waiver of a judicial forum for statutory claims.29 The Supreme Court concluded
that the ADEA claim was arbitrable and that Gilmer did not meet his burden of
showing that Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of
claims under the Act.30 The Supreme Court held that when parties have made an
agreement to arbitrate, as in the registration application, ADEA claims are subject
to arbitration.
31
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,32 the United States Supreme Court dealt
with the issue of whether an employee's rights under Title VII are subject to pro-
spective waiver.33 The court was asked to determine whether an employee's statu-
tory right to trial de novo under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is fore-
closed by prior submission of the employee's claim to arbitration under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.34 The court reasoned that Title VII provides for an
individual's right to equal employment opportunities and that Title VII represents
a congressional command that "each employee be free from discriminatory prac-
tices."35 It follows, the court determined, that the rights conferred by Title VII
cannot be part of the collective bargaining process because waiver of these rights
would defeat the purpose of Title VII.36 The court therefore concluded that an
22. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. The Supreme Court has held enforceable, arbitration agreements relat-
ing to claims arising under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7; § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b); the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961; and § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2). Id.
(citations omitted).
23. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
24. Id. at 23.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 23-24.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id. at 26.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 35.
31. Id.
32. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
33. Id. at 38.
34. Id.
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employee's rights under Title VII are not subject to prospective waiver.37 Thus,
the Supreme Court held that the employee did not waive his cause of action under
Title VII due to previous submission of his claim to arbitration.
38
Eleven years later, in Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.,39 the Supreme Court concluded that an agreement to arbitrate
statutory claims is not a relinquishment of the substantive rights provided by the
statute, but is instead a forum selection clause.4° In analyzing which forum is
appropriate, a court shall assume that if Congress intended to preclude waiver of
the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be evident in the statutory text or
legislative history.4' The party who disfavors the arbitration agreement must
show that Congress intended to preclude waiver of the right to a judicial forum;
otherwise, that party is held to arbitration.42
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the right of companies to require
employees to arbitrate, rather than litigate, employment discrimination claims in
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.4 3 Employee Adams signed an employment
application which included an agreement to arbitrate all claims relating to em-
ployment at Circuit City.44 Adams later filed an employment discrimination law-
suit against Circuit City.45 The district court held that Adams was obligated by the
agreement to submit his claims against Circuit City to arbitration.46 While Ad-
ams' appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Ninth Circuit
held, in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co.,47 that the FAA does not apply to contracts of
employment.48
Based on its ruling in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co.,49 the Ninth Circuit held
that the arbitration agreement between Adams and Circuit City was contained in a
"contract of employment" and, therefore, was not subject to the FAA.50 The Su-
preme Court, however, determined that section 1 of the FAA only exempts con-
tracts of employment of transportation workers from the FAA. 5' Based on its
determination that the exemption only applies to transportation workers, the Su-
preme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings.52
37. Id. at 51-52.
38. Id. at51.
39. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
40. Id. at 628 (emphasis added). The agreement specifies an arbitral, versus judicial, forum for
dispute resolution. Id See also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295-96 (2002).
41. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
42. Id.
43. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
44. Id. at 109-10.
45. Id. at 110.
46. Id.
47. 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
48. Adams, 532 U.S. at 110.
49. 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
50. Adams, 532 U.S. at 110.
51. Id. at 119. Section 1 of the FAA provides that the Act shall not apply to "contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." Id. at 112.
52. Id. at 119, 124.
[Vol. 2007
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In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc., 53 the
United States Supreme Court clarified limitations on the applicability of the
FAA.54 In this case, the employee signed an application for employment which
provided that any dispute regarding his employment would be resolved by binding
arbitration. 55 The issue was whether the arbitration agreement barred the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from pursuing victim-specific
judicial relief in an enforcement action alleging that the employer violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 56 The court noted that the language of
the contract defines the scope of disputes subject to arbitration, and that nothing in
the FAA authorizes a court to compel arbitration of any issues that are not covered
in the agreement. 57 The court stated that arbitration under the FAA is a matter of
consent, not coercion. 58 Furthermore, a contract cannot bind a nonparty and, in
this case, the EEOC was not a party to the contract. 59 Therefore, the FAA did not
require the EEOC to relinquish its statutory authority when it had not agreed to do
so. 60 The Supreme Court thus concluded that the arbitration agreement at issue
did not bar the EEOC from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief on behalf of the
employee.
61
The Supreme Court distinguishes between cases involving collective bargain-
ing arbitration agreements and individually executed pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.62 When individuals are represented by a union, the collective interest
of the bargaining unit may encroach upon individual substantive rights. 6 ' How-
ever, in an individual employment contract, there is no tension between collective
representation and individual substantive rights.64 Thus, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that collective bargaining agreements are not subject to arbitration, while
individual agreements are subject to arbitration.65
Notably, in subjecting individual agreements to arbitration, the Supreme
Court focuses on the four corners of the written document without considering the
context in which those agreements were made.66  Some individual arbitration
agreements are contained in employment contracts of adhesion, and are, therefore,
67non-negotiable. A prospective employee cannot bargain for the terms of the
agreement. 68 These ayreements waive an employee's statutory rights to litigate9
discrimination claims. It is problematic for the court to look solely at the docu-
53. 534 U.s. 279 (2002).
54. See id. at 289.
55. Id. at 282.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 289.
58. Id. at 294 (quotation and citation omitted).
59. ld.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 297-98 (citations omitted).
62. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1991).
63. See id. at 34-35.
64. See id. at 35.
65. See Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004).
66. Carol Van Sambeek, The Four Corners Approach to Judging the Enforceability of Arbitration
Agreements, Which Waive Statutory Rights to Litigate Employment Discrimination Claims, 5
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ment itself when determining whether the agreement is enforceable. 70 In doing so,
the court fails to acknowledge the circumstances in which the agreement was
made.71 By enforcing employment arbitration agreements under the four comers
approach, the court prevents workers from vindicating their rights in court.72
B. The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
The USERRA protects the employment rights of members of the armed
forces.73 Section 431 1(a) of the USERRA provides that a person who is a member
of a uniformed service shall not be denied retention in employment on the basis of
that membership.74 Section 4302(a) provides that nothing in the USERRA shall
supersede or nullify any contract that is more beneficial to a member of a uni-
formed service.75 The USERRA supersedes any state law, contract, or areement
that reduces or eliminates any right or benefit provided by the USERRA.
In Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 77 the plaintiff, a former employee of the
State of Florida, was fired because he was absent from work to attend National
Guard training.78 The plaintiff filed suit under the Veterans' Reemployment
Rights Act (VRRA) (the predecessor to the USERRA) to gain reemployment and
to receive lost wages. 79 The Fifth Circuit determined that, "[a]lthough states are
free to establish additional rights and protections supplemental to those the Act
[VRRA] provides, .. . they are not free to restrict the reemployment rights that the
Act has created.,
80
The USERRA allows for two methods in which a protected person may en-
force his or her substantive rights against a private employer. The first method
provides that a person may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor and re-
quest that the Secretary refer the complaint to the Attorney General for prosecu-




73. See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2000). The USERRA's antidiscrimination provision prohibits an
employer from denying initial employment, reemployment, or any other benefit of employment to a
person on the basis of membership in a uniformed service. Id.
74. Id.
75. "Nothing in this chapter shall supersede, nullify or diminish any Federal or State law (including
any local law or ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that establishes
a right or benefit that is more beneficial to, or is in addition to, a right or benefit provided for such
person in this chapter." 38 U.S.C. § 4302(a) (2000).
76. See id. § 4302(b).
This chapter supersedes any State law (including any local law or ordinance), contract, agree-
ment, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any
right or benefit provided by this chapter, including the establishment of additional prerequisites
to the exercise of any such right or the receipt of any such benefit.
Id.
77. 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
78. Id. at 1073.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1073-74.
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the involvement of the Secretary of Labor and the Attorney General.83 Section
4323(b) grants the district courts of the United States jurisdiction over actions
against private employers. 84
In Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly,85 the Supreme Court dealt with
whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provided for exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction. 86 Title VII provides that "[e]ach United States district court and each
United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter." 87 The court noted that
Title VII does not contain language confining jurisdiction to federal courts, and
the omission of such a provision is evidence that Congress had no such intent.
88
The court concluded that the language in Title VII conferred concurrent jurisdic-
tion on federal and state courts rather than exclusive federal jurisdiction. 89 In
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,9° the Supreme Court noted that concur-
rent jurisdiction serves to advance the objective of allowing parties a broad right
to select a forum.9 1 Furthermore, the court likened arbitration agreements to pro-
visions for concurrent jurisdiction, in that they, too, advance the objective of al-
lowing parties a broader right to select a forum.
9 2
The legislative history of USERRA § 4302 provides a starting point for de-
termining which forums Congress considered appropriate for resolution of dis-
putes arising under the USERRA. The House Committee Report states that sec-
tion 4302(b) reaffirms a general preemption as to State and local laws, as well as
to employer agreements, which provide fewer rights than are prescribed under the
USERRA.93 The Report affirms that resort to mechanisms, such as arbitration, is
not required.94 Furthermore, the Report provides that even if a person protected
under the USERRA resorts to arbitration, any arbitration decision shall not be
binding as a matter of law. 9 5 The Committee stated that rights under chapter 43
belong to the claimant, and the claimant may waive those rights, either explicitly
or impliedly, through his or her conduct. 96 However, because of the remedial
purposes of chapter 43, any waiver must be "clear, convincing, specific, un-
equivocal, and not under duress." ' 97 Only known rights which are already in exis-
tence may be waived. 98 Finally, the report provides that "an express waiver of
future statutory rights, such as one that an employer might wish to require as a
83. § 4323(a)(2).
84. § 4323(b).
85. 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
86. Id. at 823.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 826.
90. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
91. Id. at 29 (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483
(1989)).
92. Id.
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condition of employment, would be contrary to the public policy embodied in the
Committee bill and would be void."99
The USERRA was preceded by the Veteran's Reemployment Rights Act
(VRRA). The Veteran's Reemployment Rights Handbook (VRR Handbook), a
guide published by the Department of Labor under the VRRA, provided that a
person protected by the VRRA could not unconsciously waive his or her rights. 1°
The VRR Handbook specified that: "Rights generally do not mature until the vet-
eran requests reinstatement, and rights not yet matured will not readily be consid-
ered to have been waived."'' 1 Then, in the language later adopted by the drafters
of the USERRA, the VRR Handbook stated: "An express waiver of future statu-
tory reemployment rights, if required by the employer as a condition of employ-
ment, is contrary to the public policy embodied in the statute and is void."'
10 2
In Leonard v. United Airlines, Inc.,103 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
cited the anti-waiver language of the VRR Handbook in support of its holding that
the plaintiff did not waive his VRRA pension rights when he withdrew his pen-
sion contributions. ° 4 Similarly, in Lapine v. Town of Wellesley,10 5 the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals noted "the strong policy against finding a prospective
waiver of a service person's reemployment rights," and held that plaintiff's pen-
sion withdrawal did not amount to an effective waiver of such rights.'l
6
The United States Supreme Court has provided that although legislative his-
tory may be relevant, the authoritative statement of a law is the statutory text, not
the history. 10 7 Not all extrinsic materials, including legislative history, are reliable
sources of insight into Congressional intent. 0 8 Legislative history is itself often
ambiguous and contradictory.'19
C. Supreme Court Analysis of Legislation Regarding the Uniformed
Services
In Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,n °0 the United States Su-
preme Court analyzed the purpose and application of the Selective Training and
Service Act (Act)."' The Act provides employment protections for veterans re-
turning from military service.' 2 In its analysis, the court stated that the Act was
designed to protect veterans. 13 Members of the uniformed services are not to be
99. Id. (emphasis supplied).




103. 972 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1992).
104. Id. at 159.
105. 304 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2002).
106. Id. at 108.
107. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 278-81.
113. Id. at 284.
[Vol. 2007
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penalized when they return to their civilian jobs after serving in the military." 4
The court determined that the Act was to be "liberally construed for the benefit of
those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of great need."'"1 5 Fur-
thermore, the court determined its duty was to "construe the separate provisions of
the Act as parts of an organic whole and give each as liberal a construction for the
benefit of the veteran as a harmonious interplay of the separate provisions per-
mits."" 1 6 In its analysis, the court considered a Senate Committee Report, which
stated, "The Congress, in this bill, has declared as its purpose and intent that every
man who leaves his job to participate in this training and service should be reem-
ployed without loss of seniority or other benefits upon his return to civil life."''1
7
In sum, the court recognized the underlying purpose of the Act-to provide mem-
bers of the uniformed services with job security-and ruled that a liberal interpre-
tation of the Act was appropriate.'
18
More recently, in Alabama Power Co. v. Davis," 9 the United States Supreme
Court analyzed the purpose and application of the Military Selective Service Act
(the successor to the Selective Training and Service Act). 120 The court stated that
the Military Selective Service Act "evidences Congress' desire to minimize the
disruption in individuals' lives resulting from the national need for military per-
sonnel.' 2 1 The court insisted that the legislation be liberally construed for the
benefit of those in the uniformed services. 122 In Alabama, the court ruled in favor
of the employee. 123 The court ordered the employer to pay the employee the pen-
sion that the employee would have received if he had not been called to serve in
the military. 1
24
D. Concerns Regarding the Enforcement of Arbitration Provisions in Em-
ployment Contracts
Christine Godsil Cooper (Cooper) critiques Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 125 in her article, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on
the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims. 126 Cooper proposes that the Supreme
Court operated on several assumptions when it held that the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) compelled arbitration of a claim under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA). 127 The court assumed that (1) arbitration of statutory
claims will not hinder the development of the law; (2) parties bargained for the
arbitration agreement and it is fundamentally fair; and (3) because the statute pro-
114. Id.
115. Id. at 285.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 289.
118. See id. at 285.
119. 431 U.S. 581 (1977).
120. See id. at 583-84.
121. Id. at 583.
122. Id. at 584.
123. Id. at 594.
124. Id.
125. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
126. Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the Arbi-
tration of Discrimination Claims, t 1 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 203 (1992).
127. Id. at 214.
No. 1]
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vides for the possibility of settlement, it follows that arbitration is also appropri-
ate.1
28
In response to the first assumption, Cooper alleges that the privacy inherent in
arbitration programs is problematic because it prevents the development of the
law. 129 Because arbitration proceedings are generally private, outside citizens do
not know what circumstances gave rise to a dispute or what the arbitrator's deci-
sion was in such dispute. 130 Therefore, outside citizens do not have the opportu-
nity to learn from arbitrated disputes, to learn what behavior is acceptable or sanc-
tionable.13' Furthermore, because arbitrators' decisions are generally shielded
from review, a wrongful decision is likely to stand.
132
The FAA provides for judicial review only in limited circumstances. 33 The
court may vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator made his or her decision
with "manifest disregard" for the law or if the arbitrator "exceeded [his or her]
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made."' 34 Limited review raises the
concern that not only will the law fail to develop further, but also that the law will
simply not be followed. 35
In response to the second assumption, that the arbitration agreement was
freely bargained and is fair, Cooper argues that an employee, who must sign an
application as a prerequisite to his or her employment, is unlikely to fully consider
an arbitration agreement contained in the application.' 36 Therefore, it is arguable
that the inclusion of such boilerplate language amounts to coercion. 37 Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,138 was decided one month before Gilmer, and in Car-
nival, the United States Supreme Court upheld a forum selection clause contained
on a cruise ticket. 39 The court upheld this boilerplate provision although it
caused great inconvenience to the claimant, who had no opportunity to negotiate
the terms of the contract provided on the ticket.' 40 Due to the decision in Carni-
val, Gilmer could not prevail in an argument that the arbitration agreement was
coerced or unfair. 14  However, an arbitration clause, as in Gilmer, may have a
greater impact than a forum selection clause, as in Carnival.142 While a forum
selection clause selects from among equally qualified judges to hear a case pursu-
ant to similar procedural rules, an arbitration clause selects a decision-making
body which is allowed to exercise great discretion in determining statutory rights,





131. Id. at 214-15.
132. Id. at 215.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 216.
135. Id. at 217.
136. Id. at 220-21.
137. Id. at 221.
138. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
139. Cooper, supra note 126, at 221.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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In response to the third assumption, that the statute's contemplation of settle-
ment allows for the conclusion that arbitration is permissible, Cooper emphasizes
the distinction between private settlement of a statutory claim and a pre-dispute
agreement to arbitrate all future statutory claims. l 4 Private settlement occurs
after a dispute arises and after parties have analyzed the strengths and weaknesses
of the case.145 By contrast, when a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is made, the
parties are not in conflict, they do not know what potential conflict they may have,
and they do not know what the applicable state of the law will be if a dispute
arises. 46 In the employment context, arbitration clauses may be included as a
non-negotiable condition of employment due to the employer's prediction that he
is more likely to win in arbitration than in litigation; thus, "settlement is based on
a prediction of the outcome of litigation," while "arbitration is based on an avoid-
ance of the outcome of litigation."
14 7
Cooper suggests that while employment discrimination suits can be arbi-
trated, a mechanism is needed to redirect matters of public policy and statutory
construction to the courts. 148 She suggests that such issues should be removed
from arbitration or that judicial review of arbitration awards concerning such is-
sues should be allowed.' 49 Cooper asserts that full discovery is necessary in the
arbitration context, due to the practical problems of proof of discrimination. 50
Also, an employment arbitration program must authorize the arbitrator to award
the full relief available under statute or common law, to ensure that employers do
not eliminate the possibility of punitive damages.' 51 Lastly, employers should not
unilaterally impose arbitration programs into a workplace, unless the program
provides additional substantive rights to employees. 152
The article, Contract and Jurisdiction153 by Paul D. Carrington (Carrington)
and Paul H. Haagen (Haagen) provides a critique of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.,'54 which is consistent with Christine Godsil Cooper's 155 critique dis-
cussed above. Carrington and Haagen note that the Supreme Court distinguished
its earlier decisions, which held that employment discrimination claims arising
under the Civil Rights Act are not subject to binding arbitration, on the ground
that collective bargaining agreements were at issue in those cases. 156 While arbi-
trators have no authority to decide civil rights claims where collective bargaining
agreements are involved, they do have the authority to enforce individual con-
tracts. 157 The implication of this distinction is that "an arbitration clause in an
individual contract of employment can extend arbitral jurisdiction to Title VII




148. Id. at 241.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 241-42.
152. Id. at 242.
153. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331
(1997).
154. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
155. Cooper, supra note 126.
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claims despite the FAA's explicit exclusion of employment contracts."' 58 The
authors note that the extension of arbitration into employment law has generated
not only criticism, but also resistance.
59
In 1994, a Special Task Force, created by leaders of organizations including
the National Academy of Arbitrators and the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution, produced a protocol for the arbitration of statutory discrimination
claims which would provide an equal role for the employee in arbitrator selection,
discovery, and review for errors of law.' In 1996, The Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission issued its own National Enforcement Plan in opposition to
the use of arbitration; the Commission did not want the use of arbitration to un-
dermine its authority to enforce civil rights laws.'
6
'
The authors propose that after the Supreme Court's recent decisions, includ-
ing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 162 and Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,163 "it is not clear that there remains any private
claim of federal right that cannot be diverted into an arbitral tribunal."' The
authors assert that under the arbitration law established by the Supreme Court, the
following consequences arise: workers, consumers, shippers, passengers, and
franchisees will all be harmed; the protective police power of the federal and state
governments is weakened; and at least some, if not many, commercial arbitrations
will be made more costly while courts determine whether arbitrators have been
faithful to federal laws.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,166 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
analyzed whether the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act (USERRA) precludes the enforcement of arbitration agreements.167 Initially,
the court asserted that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) treats arbitration agree-
ments as equal to other contracts.' 68 Because Garrett and Circuit City agreed to
arbitrate the present dispute,169 the court determined that the agreement was en-
forceable unless Garrett could show that Congress intended to preclude arbitration
by the enactment of the USERRA. 170  Although the USERRA provides that a
person may pursue a civil action in federal court and Garrett sought to exercise
158. Id. at 370.
159. Id. at 371.
160. Id. at 371-72.
161. Id. at 372.
162. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
163. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
164. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 153, at 377.
165. Id. at 401.
166. 499 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006).
167. Id. at 673.
168. Id. at 674.
169. The parties concurred that Garrett had notice of Circuit City's arbitration policy and that Garrett
could have opted-out, but did not do so. Garrett continued to work for Circuit City for several years
after the policy was adopted. Texas law presumes that Garrett understood and accepted the policy
terms. Therefore, Garrett and Circuit City agreed to arbitrate disputes regarding the termination of
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this option, the court concluded that Congress did not intend to preclude arbitra-
tion by granting the possibility of a federal judicial forum. 17 1 The court noted that
substantive statutory rights are enforceable through arbitration and, therefore, an
agreement to arbitrate is, in effect, a forum selection clause rather than a waiver of
substantive statutory rights. 172 USERRA § 4323(b)(3) provides for concurrent
jurisdiction, and so the court reasoned that arbitration is a permissible forum
choice. 173
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with Garrett's argument that the legislative his-
tory of the USERRA confirms congressional intent to forbid binding arbitration.174
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit cited to Supreme Court authority which suggests
that legislative history should rarely be used in statutory interpretation. 75  The
Fifth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's distinction between collective bargain-
ing arbitration agreements, which are not subject to arbitration, and individual pre-
dispute arbitration agreements, which are subject to arbitration. 76 Consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the legislative history
did not support a finding that Congress intended to exclude all arbitration under
the USERRA.
177
The Fifth Circuit noted that under the Arbitration Rules relevant to this case,
the arbitrator is authorized to award relief in accordance with applicable law.
178
The court concluded that Garrett did not show that arbitration under Circuit City's
rules would not allow him a fair opportunity to present his claims. 79 Therefore,
arbitration was not inconsistent with the purposes of the USERRA. 180 The court
also rejected Garrett's argument that the public policy interest in protecting sol-
diers under the USERRA, and thus the security of the country, necessitates the
denial of arbitration.' 8' The court asserted that the enforcement of employment
arbitration agreements does not inhibit the protections guaranteed by the
USERRA. 8 The Fifth Circuit held that USERRA claims are subject to arbitra-
tion under the FAA and, therefore, reversed the district court's refusal to compel
arbitration.
8 3
171. Id. at 676-77 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 677-78.
173. Id. at 678. USERRA § 4323(b)(3) provides that United States district courts have jurisdiction of
actions against private employers. Id. The court notes that this language does not guarantee a right to a
federal court trial and does not prohibit arbitration as an alternative forum. Id.
174. In the House Committee Report, the Committee expressed the intent that even if a person pro-
tected under the USERRA resorts to arbitration, the arbitration decision is not binding as a matter of
law. Id. at 679.
175. Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)).
176. Id. at 680.
177. Id.
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V. COMMENT
In Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,184 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit examined the FAA in the context of the uniformed services.'
85
While the Supreme Court has addressed questions of the FAA's application, it has
not ruled specifically on the application of the FAA to the USERRA. 86 By hold-
ing that USERRA claims are subject to arbitration under the FAA, the Fifth Cir-
cuit reinforces the established view that arbitration is an appropriate forum for
statutory claims, and, therefore, the court validates the arbitration process. Today,
arbitration is a widely used form of dispute resolution, and the instant decision
will further promote its use.
The Fifth Circuit's determination that Garrett's claim was subject to arbitra-
tion would have been better supported if the court had relied more heavily upon
the Supreme Court's decision Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.'87 The facts in
Adams are strikingly similar to those in the instant case; in both cases an employee
filed an employment discrimination lawsuit and the question was whether or not
the FAA applied to an arbitration agreement at issue. 188 In Adams, the Supreme
Court analyzed the FAA's coverage and concluded that only contracts of em-
ployment transportation workers are exempt from the FAA.' 89 This conclusion
implies that arbitration agreements in all other employment contracts are subject
to the FAA. Because the reasoning and outcome of Adams support the conclusion
in Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,190 the Fifth Circuit's opinion would have
been much more convincing if it had discussed Adams rather than simply making
note of it. 191
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that it is appropriate
for statutory claims to be resolved through arbitration, and the instant decision
contributes to this line of authority. 192 However, despite Supreme Court prece-
dent, the opposing view-that arbitration is not an appropriate forum for statutory
claims-is very much alive. In the instant case, by holding that claims arising
under the USERRA are subject to pre-dispute arbitration agreements, the Fifth
Circuit severely hampers the protections provided by the USERRA. Disallowing
members of the uniformed services to pursue their statutory claims in court clearly
limits the avenues in which such persons may vindicate their rights. A binding
arbitration agreement is not merely a forum selection clause; it dictates the proc-
ess through which a person may pursue his or her claim. Furthermore, arbitration
agreements contained in employment contracts may be coercive; for example, if
an employee must assent to the terms of the agreement as a condition of his or her
employment. Submission to binding, coercive arbitration agreements is most
certainly not what the drafters of the USERRA intended as they strove to formu-
184. 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006).
185. See id.
186. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
187. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
188. See id.
189. Id. at 111-12, 119.
190. 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006).
191. See id. at 675.
192. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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late protections for members of the uniformed services. In a Reserve Officers
Association Law Review article, 193 Captain Samuel F. Wright 194 echoed these
sentiments; he stated that if the decision in Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 
95
is allowed to stand, it could "gut the effective enforcement of USERRA."
'1 96
The Fifth Circuit relied on EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,19 7 in support of its
conclusion that an agreement to arbitrate under the FAA is not a waiver of statu-
tory rights. In doing so, the court blatantly omitted discussion of the "anti-
waiver" language contained in the House Committee Report from its analysis.
The House Committee Report provides that an express waiver of future statutory
rights would be void. 198 This same anti-waiver language was used in the hand-
book accompanying the Veteran's Reemployment Rights Act (VRRA), which
preceded the USERRA. 199 The appellate courts in both Leonard v. United Air-
lines, Inc.20 and Lapine v. Town of Wellesley20 1 adhered to the anti-waiver lan-
guage and did not find waiver of the plaintiffs' statutory rights.
In the instant decision, Garrett did not "opt-out" of the arbitration policy
within the allotted time period.20 2 By failing to opt-out, Garrett effectively waived
his future right to bring suit under the USERRA. The Fifth Circuit neglects to
address the strong argument that such waiver is void according to the language in
the House Committee Report. The court was wrong to omit discussion of the anti-
waiver language from its analysis. If the Fifth Circuit had addressed, and dis-
posed of, the argument that waiver of future statutory rights is void, its decision in
Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., would have been much stronger; however, its
failure to address this argument leaves a problematic gap in its reasoning. 203
The Fifth Circuit failed to consider the Supreme Court's analysis in both
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,F°4 and Alabama Power Co. v.
Davis,205 which provides that legislation enacted to protect members of the uni-
formed services should be construed liberally for such members' benefit. In both
Fishgold and Alabama, the court recognized the importance of protecting those
206who serve in the military from being disadvantaged at home. In Garrett v. Cir-
cuit City Stores, Inc.,207 however, the Fifth Circuit adhered to the four comers of
193. Captain Samuel F. Wright, Mandatory Arbitration Mandate: Court ruling sets back USERRA
Enforcement, Number 0619, July/August 2006,
http://www.roa.org/site/PageServerpagename=law-review_0619 (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
194. Captain Samuel F. Wright was one of the U.S. Department of Labor lawyers who helped draft
the USERRA. See id.
195. 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006).
196. Captain Samuel F. Wright, Mandatory Arbitration Mandate: Court ruling sets back USERRA
Enforcement, Number 0619, July/August 2006,
http://www.roa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=law-review_0619 (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
197. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
198. H.R.REP. No. 103-65(1) (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2453.
199. See supra Part HI.B.
200. 972 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1992).
201. 304 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2002).
202. Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 2006).
203. 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006).
204. 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
205. 431 U.S. 581 (1977).
206. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946); Alabama Power Co. v.
Davis, 431 U.S. 581 (1977).
207. 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006).
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the Resolution Program paperwork, not to the main purpose of the USERRA: to
protect the employment rights of members of the armed forces. 208 Although the
Fifth Circuit's decision is in line with the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration stance,
it is out of line with the Supreme Court's analysis of legislation concerning the
uniformed services. Because the Fifth Circuit did not heed the anti-waiver lan-
guage, and did not apply the Supreme Court's liberal construction analysis, the
Fifth Circuit's ruling undermines the purpose of the USERRA by disallowing
members of the uniformed services to vindicate their rights in court.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,2° 9 the Fifth Circuit adopted the Su-
preme Court's pro-arbitration stance without fully articulating the effects of com-
pulsory arbitration in the context of the uniformed services. The Fifth Circuit
omitted important legislative history from its analysis. The legislative history of
the USERRA clearly states that an express waiver of future statutory rights would
be void. The Fifth Circuit adopted a narrow view concerning the relevance of
legislative history, specifically, that such history should rarely be used in inter-
preting the law. Even under this narrow view, the court is not excused from ne-
glecting the anti-waiver provision all together.
In focusing on the arbitrability of statutory claims in general, the Fifth Circuit
lost focus of the specific context: the uniformed services. The Supreme Court has
shown a great interest in protecting those who serve in the military from discrimi-
nation at home. The Supreme Court has construed legislation liberally so as to
benefit members of the uniformed services.
Due to the legislative history of the USERRA and the Supreme Court's lib-
eral construction of legislation concerning the military, the Fifth Circuit should
have held that claims arising under the USERRA are not subject to a pre-dispute
individually contracted arbitration agreement. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit would
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